No. 105: When Should a Firm Employ its Workers? A Relational Contracting Approach

Jahr: 2022
Typ: Working Paper
Open Science:

Abstract

A principal hiring an agent chooses between employment and self-employment. Under employment, the principal can control the manner in which the agent performs the assignment (the ‘work design’), whereas this is legally forbidden under self-employment. Due to incomplete contracts, the relationship is governed by relational agreements, which are influenced by the allocation of control. We show that employment typically results in an over-demanding work design, compared to an under-demanding work design under self-employment, and that employment relationships are more rigid and better suited to favorable production environments. We further examine the impact of taxation, minimum wages, and formal performance pay.

 

Beteiligte Institutionen

Die Hauptstandorte vom TRR 266 sind die Universität Paderborn (Sprecherhochschule), die HU Berlin und die Universität Mannheim. Alle drei Standorte sind seit vielen Jahren Zentren für Rechnungswesen- und Steuerforschung. Hinzu kommen Wissenschaftler der LMU München, der Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, der Universität zu Köln, der Leibniz Universität Hannover und der TU Darmstadt, die die gleiche Forschungsagenda verfolgen.

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