Cross-border tax evasion after the common reporting standard: Game over?

Jahr: 2020

Typ: Journal Publication

Fachzeitschrift: Journal of Public Economics

Open Science:

Bronze

Abstract

We study the short-term effect of the first global multilateral standard for the automatic exchange of information (AEOI), the so-called Common Reporting Standard (CRS), on cross-border tax evasion. Employing newly available bilateral data on cross-border deposits, we find that the CRS induced a reduction of 11.5% in cross-border deposits parked in tax havens. However, despite the 4000 bilateral information exchange relations created under the CRS, deposit relocation is still an option for secrecy-seeker. We find that the United States, which did not commit to the CRS, emerges as an attractive location for cross-border deposits.

Veröffentlichungsinformationen

TRR 266 researchers

Elisa Casi-Eberhard Norwegian School of Economics

Barbara Stage WHU

External researchers

Christoph Spengel

Volume Number

190

DOI

DOI Link

Open Science

To cite this article

Casi-Eberhard, E., Spengel, C., & Stage, B. (2020). Cross-border tax evasion after the common reporting standard: Game over? Journal of Public Economics, 190. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104240

Zugehörige Projekte

B07

Costs and Benefits of Tax Transparency

Beteiligte Institutionen

Die Hauptstandorte vom TRR 266 sind die Universität Paderborn (Sprecherhochschule), die HU Berlin und die Universität Mannheim. Alle drei Standorte sind seit vielen Jahren Zentren für Rechnungswesen- und Steuerforschung. Hinzu kommen Wissenschaftler der LMU München, der Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, der Universität zu Köln und der Leibniz Universität Hannover, die die gleiche Forschungsagenda verfolgen.