No. 77: Wait, what? The consequences of not disclosing feedback-stimulating information

Abstract

Recent evidence suggests that managers use voluntary CAPEX guidance to stimulate market feedback by incentivizing informed trading in their stock prices. We show a related decrease in nondisclosing firms’ informed trading measures. The reduction in informed trading is pronounced in unexpected nondisclosure, consistent with the interpretation that traders perceive nondisclosure as indicating low gains from informed trading. Less informed trading is associated with a reduction in investment-q sensitivity and future performance for nondisclosing firms. Overall, we document a novel link between managers’
strategic disclosure decisions, the feedback channel, and real effects.

Participating Institutions

TRR 266‘s main locations are Paderborn University (Coordinating University), HU Berlin, and University of Mannheim. All three locations have been centers for accounting and tax research for many years. They are joined by researchers from LMU Munich, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management, ESMT Berlin, Goethe University Frankfurt and Carl von Ossietzky University Oldenburg who share the same research agenda.