Cross-border tax evasion after the common reporting standard: Game over?

Year: 2020

Type: Journal Publication

Journal: Journal of Public Economics

Abstract

We study the short-term effect of the first global multilateral standard for the automatic exchange of information (AEOI), the so-called Common Reporting Standard (CRS), on cross-border tax evasion. Employing newly available bilateral data on cross-border deposits, we find that the CRS induced a reduction of 11.5% in cross-border deposits parked in tax havens. However, despite the 4000 bilateral information exchange relations created under the CRS, deposit relocation is still an option for secrecy-seeker. We find that the United States, which did not commit to the CRS, emerges as an attractive location for cross-border deposits.

Publication Information

TRR 266 researchers

Elisa Casi-Eberhard Norwegian School of Economics

Barbara Stage WHU

External researchers

Christoph Spengel

Volume Number

190

DOI

DOI Link

To cite this article

Casi-Eberhard, E., Spengel, C., & Stage, B. (2020). Cross-border tax evasion after the common reporting standard: Game over? Journal of Public Economics, 190. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104240

Related Projects

B07

Costs and Benefits of Tax Transparency

+ 11

Participating Institutions

TRR 266‘s main locations are Paderborn University (Coordinating University), HU Berlin, and University of Mannheim. All three locations have been centers for accounting and tax research for many years. They are joined by researchers from LMU Munich, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Goethe University Frankfurt, WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management and University of Cologne who share the same research agenda.