No. 38: To share or not to share? Financial analysts‘ questioning in conference calls

Abstract

We study whether financial analysts with superior information (i.e., better-informed analysts) strategically reveal less information during earnings conference calls, and whether this information-sharing behavior allows them to maintain or enhance their information advantage. By approximating sharing of ‘new’ information with the thematic difference between management’s presentation and analysts’ questions, we find that analysts with superior information (measured as their ex-ante forecast accuracy ranking) share relatively less information in their questions. Hereby, they reduce the information content of management’s responses, but increase the likelihood of maintaining or enhancing their information advantage (measured as their ex-post forecast accuracy ranking). By introducing the role of strategic questioning induced by analysts’ information advantages as a determinant of earnings conference calls’ informativeness, this study also sheds light on the role of information intermediaries in shaping firms’ information environments.

Beteiligte Institutionen

Die Hauptstandorte vom TRR 266 sind die Universität Paderborn (Sprecherhochschule), die HU Berlin und die Universität Mannheim. Alle drei Standorte sind seit vielen Jahren Zentren für Rechnungswesen- und Steuerforschung. Hinzu kommen Wissenschaftler der LMU München, der Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, der WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management, der ESMT Berlin und der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, die die gleiche Forschungsagenda verfolgen.