No. 67: Implicit incentives and delegation in teams

Jahr: 2021

Typ: Working Paper

Open Science:

Self-contained

Abstract

We study an infinitely-repeated game of team production, where agents must supply costly effort under moral hazard. The principal also has the option to delegate an additional production-relevant decision to a team member. We provide conditions under which delegation changes the scope of peer sanction and thus influences the implicit incentives generated by the agents‘ repeated interaction. Delegation can then become strictly optimal, despite misaligned preferences and symmetric information regarding the efficient decision. We show that implicit incentives under delegation are strongest in diverse teams and use our results to discuss various aspects of organisational design.

Veröffentlichungsinformationen

TRR 266 researchers

Harvey Upton Humboldt University of Berlin

DOI

DOI Link

To cite this article

Upton, H. (2021). Implicit incentives and delegation in teams. TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series No. 66. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3991736

Zugehörige Projekte

A02

Transparency Effects of Organizational Innovations

+ 1

Beteiligte Institutionen

Die Hauptstandorte vom TRR 266 sind die Universität Paderborn (Sprecherhochschule), die HU Berlin und die Universität Mannheim. Alle drei Standorte sind seit vielen Jahren Zentren für Rechnungswesen- und Steuerforschung. Hinzu kommen Wissenschaftler der LMU München, der Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, der Universität zu Köln und der Leibniz Universität Hannover, die die gleiche Forschungsagenda verfolgen.